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OPINION OF THE COURT 
_______________ 
 
JORDAN, Circuit Judge. 
Pernod Ricard USA, LLC (“Pernod”) appeals the 
decision of the United States District Court for the District of 
Delaware that the label of “Havana Club” brand rum, a rum 
sold in the United States by Bacardi U.S.A., Inc. (“Bacardi”), 
is not a false advertisement of the rum’s geographic origin 
under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 15 U.S.C. 
§ 1125(a)(1)(B).  Because we agree with the District Court 
that no reasonable interpretation of the label as a whole could 
lead to the conclusion that it is false or misleading, we will 
affirm.   
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I.   Background 
 
A.   The Original Havana Club Rum and Its 
Trademark 
 
This case is the latest battle in a lengthy war between 
Pernod and Bacardi, two multinational distilleries, over the 
use of the words “Havana Club” to sell rum in the United 
States.  Though the convoluted history of the conflict has 
been recounted at length elsewhere, a portion of it requires 
retelling.1
 
  
Before the start of the Cuban Revolution, the 
Arechabala family produced “Havana Club” brand rum in 
Cuba, sold it locally, and exported it for sale in the United 
States.  In 1960, following the Communist revolution in 
Cuba, the Cuban government expropriated the Arechabalas’ 
business without compensation.  Three years later, the United 
States began to enforce a trade embargo against Cuba.  The 
embargo, which continues to this day, generally prevents the 
                                              
1A more detailed history is provided in Havana Club 
Holding, S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116 (2d Cir. 2000); 
Empresa Cubana Exportadora de Alimentos y Productos 
Varios v. United States Dept. of Treasury, 606 F. Supp. 2d 59 
(D.D.C. 2009) (“Empresa Cubana”); Havana Club Holding, 
S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 62 F. Supp. 2d 1085 (S.D.N.Y. 1999); 
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 1998 WL 
150983 (S.D.N.Y. Mar. 31, 1998); Havana Club Holding, 
S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 961 F. Supp. 498 (S.D.N.Y. 1997); 
Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon, S.A., 974 F. Supp. 302 
(S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
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importation of Cuban goods and is administered by the Office 
of Foreign Assets Control (“OFAC”).  Despite the embargo, 
the Cuban government in 1976, through a government-owned 
company called “Cubaexport,”2 managed to register with the 
United States Patent and Trademark Office (“USPTO”)  the 
words “Havana Club” as a trademark for use in connection 
with rum.  In 1994, through a series of transfers, the Cuban 
government assigned its claimed interests in the Arechabala 
family’s old business to a joint venture (the “JV”), of which 
Pernod Ricard, S.A., Pernod’s parent corporation, is a 
member.3
 
  That transfer included the USPTO registration for 
the “Havana Club” mark, and, in 1995, OFAC specifically 
approved the transfer of the trademark to the JV.  However, in 
1997, OFAC retroactively revoked its permission for that 
transfer.  The mark then remained registered to Cubaexport 
until July 2006, when the registration expired after OFAC 
denied permission for renewal of the mark.   
                                              
2The formal name of the enterprise is “Empresa 
Cubana Exportadora De Alimentos y Productos Varios.”  
(App. at 8.) 
3Through the JV, rum branded as “Havana Club” is 
sold outside the United States.  Because of the trade embargo, 
Cuban-made rum cannot be sold in the United States.  
However, United States citizens traveling to Cuba are 
permitted to return with a limited amount of Cuban goods, 
including Havana Club rum made under the auspices of the 
JV.  It has been said that “Havana Club rum and cigars are the 
most popular items brought back.”  Havana Club Holding, 
S.A. v. Galleon S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 121 (2d Cir. 2000).   
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B.   Bacardi’s Sales of Havana Club Brand Rum 
 
 In 1994, Bacardi filed a federal trademark application 
for use of the “Havana Club” mark on rum in the United 
States,4
 
 and, for a short time in 1995, Bacardi imported from 
the Bahamas and sold in this country a nominal amount of 
rum labeled with that mark.  Soon after those limited sales, 
the JV filed suit in the United States District Court for the 
Southern District of New York to enjoin Bacardi’s use of the 
“Havana Club” trademark.  While that action was pending, 
Bacardi purchased from the Arechabala family any remaining 
rights they might have had to the “Havana Club” mark and 
the related goodwill of the business, along with any rum 
business assets the family owned.  Later, following OFAC’s 
revocation of permission for the transfer of the “Havana 
Club” mark to the JV in 1997, the JV’s case against Bacardi 
was dismissed.  See Havana Club Holding, S.A. v. Galleon 
S.A., 203 F.3d 116, 121, 135 (2d Cir. 2000).   
                                              
4That application is still pending before the USPTO.  
United States Trademark Application Serial No. 74,572,667 
(filed Sept. 12, 1994).  Bacardi also filed applications for use 
of the marks “Havana Select,” “Habana Clasico,” “Old 
Havana,” “Havana Primo,” and “Havana Clipper,” in 
connection with the sale of rum.  Registration of those marks 
was denied, and the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board 
(“TTAB”) affirmed those denials in 1997 on the basis that the 
marks were “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive … because purchasers’ belief that the rum 
products … originate in HAVANA, Cuba, is a mistaken 
belief.”  In re Bacardi & Co. Ltd., 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d 1031, 1035 
(T.T.A.B. 1997).  
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In August 2006, just days after Cubaexport’s federal 
trademark registration of  “Havana Club” expired, Bacardi 
began selling rum in Florida using “Havana Club” as the 
brand name.  The rum was distilled in Puerto Rico and was 
made using the Arechabala family recipe.5
 
  Bacardi took three 
years to develop the product, due to regulatory and 
production requirements, and, according to a member of the 
Arechabala family, it turned out to be “almost identical” to 
the original Havana Club rum made by the family in Cuba.  
The bottle in which Bacardi’s rum was sold appears below.   
                                              
5Before those sales commenced, Bacardi submitted the 
label for the rum to the Department of the Treasury’s Alcohol 
and Tobacco Tax and Trade Bureau (“T&TB”).  The T&TB 
must approve labeling of alcoholic beverage bottles and is 
tasked with preventing misleading statements on alcoholic 
beverage labels.  27 U.S.C. § 205.  The T&TB ultimately 
approved Bacardi’s Havana Club rum label in April 2008.   
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On the front of the bottle, the phrase “Havana Club™” 
appears in large stylized letters, followed by the word 
“BRAND” in much smaller letters.  Below that, in letters of 
prominent though slightly smaller size than those in the brand 
name and in a different font, the words “PUERTO RICAN 
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RUM” appear.  Beneath that, in smaller letters and different 
color ink, the label says “HAVANA CLUB™ RUM.”  The 
words “Havana Club™” are also repeated several times 
around the neck of the bottle.  The back of the bottle includes 
a statement in clearly legible type that reads as follows:  
 
Havana Club™ Rum is a premium rum distilled 
and crafted in Puerto Rico using the original 
Arechabala family recipe.  Developed in Cuba 
circa 1930, this finely crafted spirit uses black 
strap molasses, a slow fermentation process, 
five times distillation and white oak mellowing 
to create a velvet smoothness that is clean and 
round to the palate. 
The words “HAVANA CLUB™ RUM” and the web address 
“www.havanaclubus.com” also appear on the back of the 
bottle above a government-mandated health warning, which 
is followed by a toll-free number containing the letters 
HAVANA and, in small print, the phrases “Produced by 
Havana Club, U.S.A., San Juan, P.R.” and “Havana Club is a 
trademark.”  
 
C.   The Instant Case 
 
In 2006, shortly after Bacardi began its sales of the 
Havana Club rum made in Puerto Rico, Pernod filed this false 
advertising suit under Section 43(a)(1)(B) of the Lanham Act, 
asserting that the labeling of Bacardi’s bottle, particularly the 
use of the words “Havana Club,” misleads consumers to 
believe that the rum is produced in Cuba.  At the conclusion 
of  a three-day bench trial, in which Pernod presented 
unrebutted survey evidence that approximately eighteen 
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percent of consumers who looked at the Havana Club rum 
bottle were left thinking that the rum was made in Cuba or 
from Cuban ingredients,6
 
 the District Court ruled in favor of 
Bacardi.  The Court found that the Havana Club brand name 
reflected the Cuban heritage of the rum’s recipe.  According 
to the Court, Bacardi “has a First Amendment right to 
accurately portray where its product was historically made 
and, therefore, plaintiff cannot demonstrate that defendant’s 
use of ‘Havana Club’ violates … the Lanham Act.”  (App. at 
26.)  The District Court also said that, because the “Havana 
Club label clearly and truthfully provides the origin of 
[Bacardi]’s rum, and is not deceptive” (App. at 23), there was 
no need “to analyze actual (or likely) consumer deception” 
(App. at 27).  The District Court thus bypassed Pernod’s 
survey evidence, holding that “[a] court is permitted to find, 
as a matter of law, that no reasonable consumer could be 
misled by the challenged advertising.”  (App. at 23 n.19.) 
 Pernod timely appealed the District Court’s decision 
on the sole ground that the Court erroneously failed to 
consider the survey evidence presented by Pernod.   
 
                                              
6Pernod’s expert said that his analytical approach 
included understanding “the percentage of respondents stating 
that the product was made in either Havana or Cuba and/or 
that the product’s ingredients came from Cuba.  These 
respondents were classified as ‘misled.’”  (App. at 930.) 
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II.   Discussion7
 
 
   It appears that this false advertising dispute is a proxy 
for the real fight the parties want to have, which is over the 
right to the exclusive use of “Havana Club” as a trademark.  
Under the peculiar circumstances of the Cuban trade embargo 
and the attendant denial of an opportunity to register and 
protect “Havana Club” as a mark for rum in the United States, 
Pernod has turned to the false advertising provision of the 
Lanham Act, § 43(a)(1)(B).8
 
  Section 43(a)(1)(B) provides in 
pertinent part: 
(1) Any person who, on or in connection with 
any goods or services, or any container for 
goods, uses in commerce any word, term, name, 
symbol, or device, or any combination thereof, 
                                              
7The District Court had jurisdiction over this action 
based upon 28 U.S.C. § 1331.  We exercise jurisdiction 
pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1291.  We review the District Court’s 
findings of fact for clear error and its conclusions of law de 
novo.  Hooven v. Exxon Mobil Corp., 465 F.3d 566, 572 (3d 
Cir. 2006).   
8This is not the first time the false advertising 
provision of the Lanham Act has been asked to stand in for a 
trademark action during the course of the battle over the 
“Havana Club” mark.  In litigation before the United States 
District Court for the Southern District of New York and the 
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit, a 
corporation formed by the JV, Havana Club International, 
S.A., was pressing a false advertising claim but was held to 
lack standing because it sold no rum in the United States.  See 
Havana Club Holding, S.A., 203 F.3d at 119, 130-33.  
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or any false designation of origin, false or 
misleading description of fact, or false or 
misleading representation of fact, which –  
 
… 
 
(B) in commercial advertising or 
promotion, misrepresents the 
nature, characteristics, qualities, 
or geographic origin of his or her 
or another person’s goods, 
services, or commercial activities,  
 
shall be liable in a civil action by any person 
who believes that he or she is or is likely to be 
damaged by such act. 
 
15 U.S.C. § 1125.  
 
To establish a false advertising claim under the 
Lanham Act, a plaintiff must prove:  
 
1) that the defendant has made false or 
misleading statements as to his own product [or 
another’s]; 2) that there is actual deception or at 
least a tendency to deceive a substantial portion 
of the intended audience; 3) that the deception 
is material in that it is likely to influence 
purchasing decisions; 4) that the advertised 
goods traveled in interstate commerce; and 5) 
that there is a likelihood of injury to the plaintiff 
in terms of declining sales, loss of good will, 
etc. 
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Warner-Lambert v. Breathasure, 204 F.3d 87, 91-92 (3d Cir. 
2000) (citing Johnson & Johnson-Merck Consumer Pharm. 
Co. v. Rhone-Poulenc Rorer Pharm., Inc., 19 F.3d 125, 129 
(3d Cir. 1994)).  As to the second element, actual deception 
or a tendency to deceive is presumed if a plaintiff proves that 
an advertisement is unambiguous and literally false.  Novartis 
Consumer Health, Inc. v. Johnson & Johnson-Merck 
Consumer Pharm. Co., 290 F.3d 578, 586 (3d Cir. 2002).  If 
the message conveyed by an advertisement is literally true or 
ambiguous, however, the plaintiff must prove actual 
deception or a tendency to deceive, and it may do so with a 
properly conducted consumer survey.  Id. at 586, 588-90; 
Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 F.3d at 129-31.   
 
Pernod submitted a consumer survey at the trial and 
asserts that the District Court was required to consider it 
when determining if Bacardi’s “Havana Club” label 
amounted to a misleading statement of geographic origin.  
According to Pernod, “[r]esolution of the ‘pivotal legal 
question’ of whether an advertisement, like Bacardi USA’s 
label, implies an inaccurate message to a sufficient number of 
consumers ‘virtually demands survey research because it 
centers on consumer perception and memory.’”  (Appellant’s 
Op’g Br. at 30 (quoting Fed. Judicial Ctr., Reference Manual 
on Scientific Evidence 235 (2d ed. 2000).)  Bacardi responds, 
in line with the District Court’s reasoning, that the initial step 
in analyzing a statement challenged as false advertising is to 
“‘determine[] what message is conveyed.’”  (Appellee’s 
Ans’g Br. at 18 (quoting United States Healthcare, Inc. v. 
Blue Cross of Greater Phila., 898 F.2d 914, 921 (3d Cir. 
1990)).)   And, Bacardi emphasizes, our precedent provides 
that “‘[s]ometimes this determination may be made from the 
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advertisement on its face.’”  Id. (quoting United States 
Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 922).  
 
To address the competing arguments before us, we 
must first consider the District Court’s reasoning in greater 
detail.  The Court admitted Pernod’s survey evidence but 
decided at step one of the analytical process that no false or 
misleading statement was made, so no survey evidence was 
needed.  Indeed, the Court questioned whether “Havana 
Club” is even an actionable statement under § 43(a)(1)(B) 
because “[i]t is not self-evident that … [it is] a statement[] of 
fact capable of being proven false.”  (App. at 17 (internal 
quotation marks and citation omitted).)  “Havana Club” is, 
said the Court, “not the same as ‘Made in Havana’ or even 
‘Havana Rum,’ such as would impart a specific, verifiable 
claim.”  (Id.)  But, assuming for the sake of analysis that the 
words “Havana Club” do constitute an actionable statement, 
the Court turned to what it saw as the “unique question” 
presented by this case, namely, “is ‘geographic origin’ more 
akin to ‘heritage’ or to the ‘source of production’?”  (Id. at 
18.)   
 
After considering the development of the right of 
action arising from a “false designation of origin” and 
exploring the meaning of “origin,” the District Court 
discounted the relevance of the precedents it had just 
reviewed.  It drew a distinction between § 43(a)(1)(A), which 
is the subsection of § 43(a) that is focused on trademarks and, 
more generally, unfair competition, and § 43(a)(1)(B), which 
is the subsection at issue here and addresses false advertising.  
Section 43(a)(1)(A) forbids, among other things, false or 
misleading representations that may deceive consumers about 
the “origin” of goods or services, while § 43(a)(1)(B) forbids 
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false or misleading representations as to the “geographic 
origin” of goods and services.  In light of the addition of the 
modifier “geographic” to the word “origin” in § 43(a)(1)(B), 
the District Court considered authority regarding 
§ 43(a)(1)(A) to be “not particularly instructive on the 
meaning of ‘geographical origin’ as used in § 43(a)(1)(B).”  
(App. at 21.)   
 
The Court acknowledged that the Supreme Court has 
held in a § 43(a)(1)(A) case that “origin” refers to “the 
producer of the tangible goods that are offered for sale, and 
not the author of any idea, concept, or communication 
embodied in those goods.”  Dastar Corp. v. Twentieth 
Century Fox Film Corp., 539 U.S. 23, 37 (2003).  
“[A]pplying that focus to the interpretation of ‘geographical 
origin,’” the District Court said, “would implicate the place of 
manufacture, rather than the source of that product’s recipe or 
its heritage.”  (App. at 21.)  Nevertheless, relying on a 
decision of the Trademark Trial and Appeal Board (“TTAB”), 
an administrative tribunal in the USPTO, the Court 
considered it “plausible” that the term “geographic origin” in 
the false advertising context may be broad enough to embody 
a product’s heritage, including its history and recipe.  (Id. 
(citing Corporacion Habanos, S.A. v. Anncas, Inc., 88 
U.S.P.Q. 2d 1785, 1791 (T.T.A.B. 2008) (“a product may be 
found to originate from a place, even though the product is 
manufactured elsewhere”)).)  But, according to the reasoning 
of the District Court, regardless of whether one considered 
geographic origin as simply a question of where something is 
made or, instead, took the broader “heritage” approach to the 
question of geographic origin, Pernod’s claim failed, and it 
did so for reasons that made survey evidence irrelevant. 
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As to the place of manufacture, the Court was 
persuaded that “[t]he Havana Club label clearly and truthfully 
provides the origin of defendant’s rum, and is not deceptive.”  
(App. at 23.)  The label proclaims the contents of the bottle to 
be “Puerto Rican Rum” and specifically says the rum is 
“distilled and crafted in Puerto Rico[.]”  (App. at 12.)  The 
District Court saw no room for deception in that.9  Quoting 
the decision of the United States Court of Appeals for the 
Seventh Circuit in Mead Johnson & Co. v. Abbott Labs., 201 
F.3d 883, 886 (7th Cir. 2000), amended on denial of reh’g, 
209 F.3d 1032 (7th Cir. 2000) (per curium),10
 
 the District 
Court said, “survey research does not determine the meaning 
of words or ‘set the standard to which objectively verifiable 
claims must be held.’”  (App. at 23.)  
Turning to the question of heritage, the Court declared 
that “Havana Club rum has a Cuban heritage and, therefore, 
depicting such a heritage is not deceptive.”  (App. at 24.)  
Under this broader interpretation of the term “geographic 
origin,” Pernod’s survey evidence was necessarily irrelevant, 
in the Court’s view, because Bacardi should have a  First 
Amendment right “to accurately portray where its rum was 
historically made – as opposed to claiming that the product is 
still made there.”  (Id. at 25.)  The Court found it particularly 
                                              
9The Court found it persuasive that “the federal agency 
charged with monitoring consumer deception in labeling” 
alcohol, the TTB, approved Bacardi’s use of the “Havana 
Club” label.  (App. at 23.)  
10The District Court relied upon the unamended 
opinion but cited portions of the opinion that were untouched 
by the later amendments.   
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important that Bacardi’s Havana Club rum is based on the 
Arechabala family’s original Havana Club recipe.   
 
While we may not agree with every aspect of the 
foregoing analysis,11
                                              
11We question whether the District Court should have 
endeavored to use the modifier “geographic” to expand the 
meaning of “origin” into the realm of history, heritage, and 
culture.  See Dastar, 539 U.S. at 38 (stating that a claim for 
false advertising relating to the authenticity of a good would 
fall under the “‘misrepresents the nature, characteristics [or] 
qualities’ provision of § 43(a)(1)(B)”).  As the Court itself 
observed, applying the Supreme Court’s interpretation of the 
word “origin” from Dastar may lead more naturally to an 
understanding of “geographic origin” as implicating the place 
of a product’s manufacture, not a broad inquiry into the 
product’s background, see id. at 29-32, 37 (clarifying that the 
term “origin” as used in § 43(a)(1)(A) encompasses both the 
geographic location in which the “tangible product sold in the 
marketplace” was produced and the “producer of the tangible 
goods that are offered for sale” but does not incorporate “the 
author of any idea, concept, or communication embodied in 
those goods”).  However, whether “origin” acquires a broader 
rather than a narrower meaning when the adjective 
“geographic” is placed before it is not something we need to 
decide now. 
 we are persuaded that the District 
Court’s carefully reasoned opinion reaches the right result on 
the particular facts of this case.  More specifically, we 
conclude, as did the District Court, that the Havana Club 
label, taken as a whole, could not mislead any reasonable 
consumer about where Bacardi’s rum is made, which means 
that survey evidence has no helpful part to play on the 
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question of what the label communicates regarding 
geographic origin.   
 
The central conceptual problem before us is whether 
language can be clear enough that its meaning is beyond 
reasonable dispute.  Pernod is of course correct that the issue 
in false advertising cases is “whether an advertisement, like 
[Bacardi’s] label, implies an inaccurate message … .”  
(Appellant’s Op’g Br. at 30.)  That is somewhat of a 
tautology, but Pernod’s choice of the word “implies” is apt 
because it rightly indicates that the words themselves have 
meaning beyond the subjective inferences of any individual 
reader or listener.  Words, malleable though they may be over 
time, must still, of necessity, be repositories of commonly 
accepted meaning at any given point in time.  Were it 
otherwise, ordinary discourse would be impossible.   
 
While they lack the precision of numbers, words must, 
as nearly as possible, be accorded an objectively reasonable 
meaning if law is to have any fair claim as an instrument of 
justice.  Proof of that is found throughout the law.  See, e.g., 
Wilson v. Quadramed Corp., 225 F.3d 350, 354-55 (3d Cir. 
2000) (holding that we read the Federal Debt Collection 
Practices Act to protect the “least sophisticated consumer,” 
which includes the “gullible as well as the shrewd,”  because 
the Act is a consumer protection law, but we “preserv[e] a 
quotient of reasonableness and presum[e] a basic level of 
understanding and willingness to read with care” (quoting 
United States v. Nat’l Fin. Servs., Inc., 98 F.3d 131, 136 (4th 
Cir. 1996)) (internal quotation marks omitted)); Victor v. 
Nebraska, 511 U.S. 1, 29 (1994) (“When reviewing a jury 
instruction that defines ‘reasonable doubt,’ it is necessary to 
consider the instruction as a whole and to give the words their 
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common and ordinary meaning.” (citing Estelle v. McGuire, 
502 U.S. 62, 72 (1991))); Old Colony R.R. v. Comm’r, 284 
U.S. 552, 560 (1932) (in interpreting statutory language, “the 
plain, obvious and rational meaning of a statute is always to 
be preferred to any curious, narrow, hidden sense”) (internal 
quotation marks omitted); Karedes v. Ackerley Grp., Inc., 423 
F.3d 107, 113-14 (2d Cir. 2005) (“[C]ourts must give the 
disputed language a fair reading in the context of the 
publication as a whole.  Challenged statements are not to be 
read in isolation, but must be perused as the average reader 
would against the whole apparent scope and intent of the 
writing” and that “[i]t is the meaning reasonably attributable 
to the intended reader that controls.” (emphasis added and 
removed)); Hatfill v. New York Times Co., 416 F.3d 320, 333 
(4th Cir. 2005) (applying a “reasonable reader” standard 
under Virginia law to a motion to dismiss a defamation 
claim); Temme v. Bemis Co., 622 F.3d 730, 734 (7th Cir. 
2010) (“A contract’s meaning is a matter of law; where there 
is no contractual ambiguity, there is no need for extrinsic 
evidence and no factual dispute that precludes summary 
judgment. When interpreting contracts, terms are given their 
‘ordinary and popular’ meaning … .” (internal citations 
omitted)); United Paperworkers Int’l Union v. Misco, Inc., 
484 U.S. 29, 36-38 (1987) (arbitrator applying collective 
bargaining agreement cannot ignore the plain language of the 
contract). 
 
While most of these examples are from areas of law 
that do not require, as does the law of false advertising, a 
studied effort to understand what words mean from the 
perspective of members of the consuming public, they do 
show that there is and must be a point at which language is 
used plainly enough that the question ceases to be “what does 
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this mean” and becomes instead “now that it is clear what this 
means, what is the legal consequence.”   
 
The Mead Johnson decision demonstrates the 
principle.  In that case, the Seventh Circuit considered 
whether the phrase “1st Choice of Doctors” could be 
misleading.  The court acknowledged that, in the context of a 
false advertising case, “whether a claim is ‘false’ or 
‘misleading’ is an issue of fact rather than law[,]” but it went 
on to say that “[t]he sort of survey evidence Mead Johnson 
gathered would not support a conclusion by a reasonable 
person that Abbott’s claim was false or implied a falsehood.”  
Mead Johnson, 209 F.3d at 1034 (reciting language added to 
201 F.3d 883, 886-87).  Recognizing that there is a baseline 
meaning to some words that put them beyond any credible 
claim of misunderstanding, the Seventh Circuit said, “never 
before has survey research been used to determine the 
meaning of words, or to set the standard to which objectively 
verifiable claims must be held.”  Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 
886.   
 
Though the Mead Johnson opinion is not without its 
detractors, see Rebecca Tushnet, Running the Gamut from A 
to B: Federal Trademark and False Advertising Law, 159 U. 
PA. L. REV. 1305, 1319 n.54 (2011) (hereafter “Tushnet”), we 
agree with its general proposition that there are circumstances 
under which the meaning of a factually accurate and facially 
unambiguous statement is not open to attack through a 
consumer survey.  In other words, there may be cases, and 
this is one, in which a court can properly say that no 
reasonable person could be misled by the advertisement in 
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question.12
 
  Cf. Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 884 (survey 
evidence is inappropriate when “it is all but impossible to call 
the [advertising] claim [at issue] misleading”).  
Here, there is a factually accurate, unambiguous 
statement of the geographic origin of Havana Club rum.  The 
label clearly states on the front that the liquor is “Puerto 
Rican Rum” and, on the back, that it is “distilled and crafted 
in Puerto Rico.”  No reasonable consumer could be misled by 
those statements, and the rest of the label does not put those 
statements in doubt.13
                                              
12It has been said in recent, thoughtful, academic 
commentary that, in a false advertising case, consumer survey 
evidence should not be necessary to demonstrate consumer 
confusion if that confusion would be clear, i.e., “when other 
factors strongly favor a finding of likely confusion.”  Tushnet 
at 1339 (noting that “[w]hen a consumer is likely to receive a 
false message, a court should be able to act even without a 
survey in hand”).  While the parallel is not perfect, it is 
similarly appropriate to conclude that a consumer survey 
should not be necessary or dispositive when it is plain from 
an advertisement that rational confusion is not possible.  A 
logical conclusion, and one we reach here, is that if “[c]ourts 
should be more willing to use common sense in finding 
deceptiveness,” id. at 1343, they should likewise be prepared 
to use common sense to conclude that an advertisement, when 
taken as a whole, could not mislead a rational consumer.  
  Pernod counters, however, that the 
13We do not, nor need we, address the situation in 
which the statement of the geographic origin in an 
advertisement is contained in fine print.  The portions of the 
label that put the meaning of the advertisement beyond 
reasonable dispute here are plainly legible.  Moreover, the 
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words “Havana Club” are misleading as to the geographic 
origin of the rum.  If we were dealing with those words in 
isolation, we might agree.  There are administrative decisions 
that do.14
 
   See Corporacion Habanos,  88 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 
1791 (holding that the trademark “Havana Club” was 
primarily geographically deceptively misdescriptive when 
used on cigars not produced in Cuba); In re Bacardi, 48 
U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1034-35 (affirming denial of registration to 
Bacardi for use of the trademarks “Havana Select,” “Habana 
Clasico,” “Old Havana,” “Havana Primo,” and “Havana 
Clipper,” in connection with the sale of rum because the 
marks were “primarily geographically deceptively 
misdescriptive … because purchasers’ belief that the rum 
products … originate in HAVANA, Cuba, is a mistaken 
belief”).   
                                                                                                     
phrase “Puerto Rican Rum” is particularly prominent on the 
front of the bottle.  
14The challenged phrase is not a patently unambiguous 
false statement of geographic origin like “Cuban Rum,” 
“Havana Rum,” or “Rum of Havana.”  Such was the case in 
H.N. Heusner & Son v. Federal Trade Commission, 106 F.2d 
596 (3d Cir. 1939), and El Moro Cigar Co. v. Federal Trade 
Commission, 107 F.2d 429 (4th Cir. 1939).  See also Heusner, 
106 F.2d at 597-98 (affirming a decision by the Federal Trade 
Commission to bar the use of the “totally false” brand name 
“Havana Smokers” on cigars made in the United States with 
United States tobacco); El Moro, 107 F.2d at 430-32 
(affirming FTC order barring the use of “Havana Counts” for 
falsely implying that cigars were of Cuban origin). 
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But, as we have already emphasized, we are not 
dealing with those words in isolation.  This is not a trademark 
case, and certainly not one addressing trademark registration, 
no matter how much Pernod may wish it were.  We are 
obligated in this false advertising case under § 43(a)(1)(B) to 
look at the words “Havana Club” in the context of the entire 
accused advertisement, the label of the rum.15
 
  See, e.g., Am. 
Italian Pasta Co. v. New World Pasta Co., 371 F.3d 387, 392-
93 (8th Cir. 2004) (considering the phrase “America’s 
Favorite Pasta” in context of the product’s whole packaging); 
Castrol Inc. v. Pennzoil Co., 987 F.2d 939, 946 (3d Cir. 1993) 
(holding that it is appropriate to “analyze the message 
conveyed in full context”); Forschner Grp., Inc. v. Arrow 
Trading Co., 30 F.3d 348, 355 (holding that the whole 
challenged advertisement must be considered); Sandoz 
Pharm. Corp. v. Richardson-Vicks, Inc., 735 F. Supp. 597, 
600 (D. Del. 1989), aff’d, 902 F.2d 222 (3d Cir. 1990) 
(same); cf. Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Consol. Distilled Prods., 
Inc., 210 U.S.P.Q. 639, 642-45 (N.D. Ill. 1981) (considering 
the phrase “LOCH-A-MOOR” in context of the whole bottle 
of whiskey on which it was used).  And viewed in that 
context, any thought a consumer might have that the words 
“Havana Club” indicate the geographic origin of the rum 
must certainly be dispelled by the plain and explicit 
statements of geographic origin on the label.   
                                              
15Pernod evidently concedes, as it must, that 
considering the whole Bacardi rum bottle is appropriate here, 
as the survey it conducted considered the whole Bacardi rum 
bottle. 
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Put another way, even if the words “Havana Club,” 
taken in isolation, may be understood as indicating a 
product’s geographic origin in Havana, Cuba, those same 
words cannot mislead a reasonable consumer who is told in 
no uncertain terms that “Havana Club” is a brand of rum 
made in Puerto Rico.  Cf. Am. Italian Pasta, 371 F.3d at 392-
93 (holding that the phrase “America’s Favorite Pasta” in 
context of the product’s whole packaging was not an 
actionable statement under § 43(a)(1)(B)); Mead Johnson, 
209 F.3d at 1034 (adding language to 201 F.3d 883) (holding 
a reasonable person would not interpret the phrase “1st Choice 
of Doctors” to be false or imply a falsehood even in light of 
survey evidence to the contrary); Forschner, 30 F.3d at 352, 
354-56 (holding that the phrase “Swiss Army knife” when 
used in conjunction with the statement “Made in China” to 
describe a multifunction knife was not a false advertisement 
under § 43(a)(1)(B) as a matter of law because it did not 
“lend[] itself to being construed as a statement of geographic 
origin” even though “roughly 40% of the relevant public 
believe[d] [mistakenly] that a Swiss Army knife is 
manufactured in Switzerland”); Hamilton-Brown Shoe Co. v. 
Wolf Bros. & Co., 240 U.S. 251, 256-57 (1916) (holding that, 
as a matter of law, a trademark used on shoes, “The American 
Girl,” was not a “geographical or descriptive term”). 
 
Under these circumstances, a district court can 
properly disregard survey evidence as immaterial, because, by 
definition, § 43(a)(1) does not forbid language that reasonable 
people would have to acknowledge is not false or 
misleading.16
                                              
16This is not an assertion that literally truthful claims 
cannot be misleading and therefore cannot be actionable.  See 
  Cf. 15 U.S.C. § 1125(a)(1) (Lanham Act 
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Novartis, 290 F.3d at 586, 588-90; Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 
F.3d at 129-31; cf. Tushnet, at 1319-20 (citing Mead Johnson 
for the proposition that “[f]alse advertising doctrine has … 
occasionally flirted with the idea that truthful claims simply 
can’t be misleading”).  It is rather an acknowledgement that 
false advertising claims occupy no special niche separating 
them from the standard rule that, once something – for 
example the meaning of text – is beyond reasonable dispute, 
there is no longer a question of fact; there is only the question 
of how the law applies to established fact.  That conclusion is 
consistent with our holdings that what matters in false 
advertising cases is “the message that is conveyed to 
consumers.”  Rhone-Poulenc Rorer, 19 F.3d at 129.  As we 
have held, “[t]he probative value of a consumer survey is a 
highly fact-specific determination and a court may place such 
weight on survey evidence as it deems appropriate.”  Id. at 
134 (internal quotation marks omitted).  A consumer survey 
does not trump the district court’s role as arbiter of the 
reliability and trustworthiness of expert and hearsay evidence 
based upon statements of consumers reacting to an 
advertisement.  Judge Lasker, who coined the now widely-
accepted proposition that “the court’s reaction [to an 
advertisement] is at best not determinative and at worst 
irrelevant” in American Brands, Inc. v. R.J. Reynolds 
Tobacco Co., 413 F.Supp. 1352, 1356-57 (S.D.N.Y. 1976), 
observed that: 
[W]here, as here, the issue is whether true 
statements are misleading or deceptive despite 
their truthfulness, … [t]hough the court’s own 
reaction to the advertisements is not 
determinative, as finder of fact it is obliged to 
judge for itself whether the evidence of record 
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§ 43(a)(1), forbidding “any false designation of origin, false 
or misleading description of fact, or false or misleading 
representation of fact”).  A contrary  holding would not only 
be out of keeping with the language of § 43(a)(1), it would 
undermine the purpose of subsection (a)(1)(B) by subjecting 
advertisers to a level of risk at odds with consumer 
protection.17
                                                                                                     
establishes that others are likely to be misled or 
confused.  In doing so, the court must, of 
course, rely on its own experience and 
understanding of human nature in drawing 
reasonable inferences about the reactions of 
consumers to the challenged advertising. 
  Cf. Mead Johnson, 201 F.3d at 886 (drawing a 
McNeilab, Inc. v. Am. Home Prods. Corp., 501 F. 
Supp. 517, 525 (S.D.N.Y. 1980).  We would add that, when 
the meaning of words is beyond all reasonable dispute, there 
is no issue of fact on the question of meaning. 
17The conclusion that advertising text can be clear 
enough that it simply cannot be challenged as misleading is 
also consistent with numerous cases holding that puffery can 
be so obviously exaggerated that even credulous consumers 
cannot be misled.  See, e.g., Am. Italian Pasta, 371 F.3d at 
389-90, 392-93 (holding that puffery, including “exaggerated 
statements of bluster or boast upon which no reasonable 
consumer would rely” are non-actionable statements under 
§ 43(a)(1)(B)); United States Healthcare, 898 F.2d at 922 
(“Mere puffing, advertising that is not deceptive for no one 
would rely on its exaggerated claims, is not actionable under 
§ 43(a).” (internal quotation marks and citations omitted)); 
Marriott Corp. v. Ramada Inc., 826 F. Supp. 726, 728 
(S.D.N.Y. 1993) (dismissing false advertising claim because 
ad was an obvious parody and one that no “reasonable person 
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distinction between misleading statements and statements 
which may be subject to misunderstanding:  “Section 43(a)(1) 
forbids misleading as well as false claims, but interpreting 
‘misleading’ to include factual propositions that are 
susceptible to misunderstanding would make consumers as a 
whole worse off by suppressing truthful statements that will 
help many of them find superior products.”).   
 
We hasten to add that cases like the present one should 
be rare, for one hopes that a case with truly plain language 
will seldom seem worth the time and expense of contesting in 
court.  That this particular case, and related ones, have been 
litigated so intensely is due, it seems, to the unusual political 
baggage and branding potential involved.  A word of caution 
is nevertheless in order, so that our holding today is not taken 
as license to lightly disregard survey evidence about 
consumer reactions to challenged advertisements.  Before a 
defendant or a district judge decides that an advertisement 
could not mislead a reasonable person, serious care must be 
exercised to avoid the temptation of thinking, “my way of 
seeing this is naturally the only reasonable way.”  Thoughtful 
reflection on potential ambiguities in an advertisement, which 
can be revealed by surveys and will certainly be pointed out 
by plaintiffs, will regularly make it the wisest course to 
consider survey evidence.18
                                                                                                     
would be misled – even absent the disclaimer – into 
believing”); cf. Reilly v. Pinkus, 338 U.S. 269, 274 (1949) 
(stating that puffery in advertisements goes too far if 
“credulous persons” rely on it as a material representation of 
fact).   
 
18Again, a district court’s decision to disregard survey 
evidence is reviewable de novo, since it is founded on a legal 
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conclusion based on underlying facts, that is that no 
reasonable consumer would be misled by an advertisement.  
Here, that the bottle contains, as the District Court found, an 
unambiguous, prominent statement of origin and another 
statement which, when taken in isolation, could be seen as an 
ambiguous reference to a geographic locale are points of fact.  
Application of those facts to the ultimate question of whether 
a reasonable consumer would be confused is a matter of law 
and, thus, requires no consideration of survey evidence.  That 
rule is consistent with other areas of the law concerning 
issues of mixed questions of law and fact when a district court 
plays no unique role in determining the underlying facts.  See, 
e.g., Ornelas v. United States, 517 U.S. 690, 697 (1996) 
(holding that the “ultimate determinations of reasonable 
suspicion and probable cause” are subject to de novo review); 
Salve Regina Coll. v. Russell, 499 U.S. 225, 231 (1991) 
(“Independent appellate review of legal issues best serves the 
dual goals of doctrinal coherence and economy of judicial 
administration.”); Harte-Hanks Commc’ns, Inc. v. 
Connaughton, 491 U.S. 657, 685-686 (1989) (holding that 
“[t]he question whether the evidence in the record in a 
defamation case is sufficient to support a finding of actual 
malice is a question of law” which requires a “case-by-case 
adjudication” even though it involves some factual inquiries); 
cf. Cooter & Gell v. Hartmarx Corp., 496 U.S. 384, 401-02 
(holding that deferential review is appropriate when “the 
district court is better situated than the court of appeals to 
marshal the pertinent facts and apply [] fact-dependent legal 
standard[s]” which rely on such determinations by district 
courts such as those “[i]ssues involving credibility”); see also 
Microsoft Corp. v. i4i Ltd. P’ship, --- S.Ct. ----, 2011 WL 
2224428, *12 (June 9, 2011) (Breyer, J., concurring) 
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Finally, we emphasize once more that our conclusion 
in this case says nothing of whether the words “Havana Club” 
are eligible for registration as a trademark.  The word 
“Havana” carries a long legal history in trademark cases.  See 
Corporacion Habanos, 88 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1791 (holding that 
the trademark “Havana Club” was primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive when used on cigars not produced 
in Cuba); In re Bacardi., 48 U.S.P.Q. 2d at 1035 (affirming 
denial of registration to Bacardi for use of the trademarks 
“Havana Select,” “Habana Clasico,” “Old Havana,” “Havana 
Primo,” and “Havana Clipper,” in connection with the sale of 
rum because the marks were “primarily geographically 
deceptively misdescriptive … because purchasers’ belief that 
the rum products … originate in HAVANA, Cuba, is a 
mistaken belief”).  Agency decisions regarding the 
registration of trademarks look at the words of the mark in 
isolation and do not consider them in the context of a whole 
advertisement in which they are used.  See 
In re Budge Mfg. Co., Inc., 857 F.2d 773, 776 (Fed. Cir. 
1988) (holding with respect to a clarifying statement made in 
advertising which the trademark applicant argued negated the 
misleading nature of the mark, “This argument is beside the 
                                                                                                     
(discussing how the “ultimate question of patent validity turns 
on the correct answers to legal questions” which depends on 
“how the law applies to facts as given”); Anderson v. Liberty 
Lobby, Inc., 477 U.S. 242, 250 (1986) (holding that the 
question regarding disposition of a case by summary 
judgment as a matter of law is whether “there are any genuine 
factual issues that properly can be resolved only by a finder of 
fact because they may reasonably be resolved in favor of 
either party”). 
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issue.  It is the word of the mark, not the statement of an 
advertising circular which appellant seeks to register....” 
(quoting In re Bonide Chemical Co., 46 F.2d 705, 708 
(C.C.P.A. 1931))).  Hence, such decisions do not address the 
circumstances we have dealt with here, nor does our decision 
turn on the issues determinative in a registration case.19
                                              
19Similarly, the other cases to which Pernod points are 
inapposite because their facts are clearly distinguishable.  See, 
e.g., Scotch Whiskey Ass’n, 210 U.S.P.Q. at 641-45 (enjoining 
the sale of “LOCH-A-MOOR” whiskey under the Lanham 
Act because of the false implication that the origin of the 
whisky was Scotland, even though the whiskey was “made 
with 100 percent imported Scotch whiskies,” when the 
whiskey’s label disclosed in “small print that Loch-A-Moor is 
a domestic product”); Black Hills Jewelry Mfg. Co. v. Gold 
Rush, Inc., 633 F.2d 746, 752-53 (8th Cir. 1980) (affirming 
injunction under the Lanham Act to prevent the use of “Black 
Hills” on jewelry not manufactured in South Dakota’s Black 
Hills region); Scotch Whiskey Ass’n v. Barton Distilling Co., 
338 F. Supp. 595, 598-99 (N.D. Ill. 1971), aff’d and rev’d in 
part, 489 F.2d 809 (7th Cir. 1973) (holding that a label using 
the phrase “Blended Scotch Whiskey” to identify a whiskey 
that included spirits not produced in Scotland was a false 
designation of geographic origin under the Lanham Act); 
Grand Rapids Furniture Co. v. FTC, 134 F.2d 332 (3d Cir. 
1943) (affirming Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) order 
barring the use of “Grand Rapids” for falsely implying that 
the furniture was made in Grand Rapids, Michigan).  None of 
those cases dealt, as we do here, with a challenge to a 
statement in an advertisement that could be seen as 
ambiguously referencing the geographic origin of a product if 
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III.  Conclusion 
 
Because the phrase “Havana Club” is not a misleading 
statement of geographic origin under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the 
Lanham Act when considered in the context of Bacardi’s rum 
label, the District Court was not required to consider Pernod’s 
survey evidence.  We will therefore affirm the judgment of 
the District Court.20
                                                                                                     
read in isolation but could not be so seen if the phrase is taken 
in the context of the whole advertisement. 
 
20Given our holding that the Bacardi label does not 
violate the false advertising provision of the Lanham Act, we 
do not address the District Court’s comments regarding 
whether First Amendment rights allowed Bacardi to use the 
phrase “Havana Club.”  Furthermore, our holding would not, 
in theory, foreclose any action against Bacardi under 
§ 43(a)(1)(A) of the Lanham Act premised on Bacardi’s 
infringement of a hypothetical unregistered trademark of 
“Havana Club.”  See Forschner, 30 F.3d at 352.  Unlike the 
plaintiffs in Forschner, however, Pernod does not sell a 
product in the United States labeled with the challenged 
phrase and brought its claim solely under § 43(a)(1)(B) of the 
Lanham Act. 
